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Abstract: Investiga tions into social imaginaries have burgeoned in recent 
years. From ‘the capitalist imaginary’ to the ‘democratic imaginary’, from 
the ‘ecological imaginary’ to ‘the global imaginary’ – and beyond – the social 
imaginaries fi eld has expanded across disciplines and beyond the academy. 
Th e recent debates on social imaginaries and potential new imaginaries reveal 
a recognisable fi eld and paradigm-in-the-making. We argue that Castoriadis, 
Ricoeur, and Taylor have articulated the most important theoretical frame-
works for understanding social imaginaries, although the fi eld as a whole re-
mains heterogeneous. We further argue that the notion of social imaginaries 
draws on the modern understanding of the imagination as authentically cre-
ative (as opposed to imitative). We contend that an elaboration of social imag-
inaries involves a signifi cant, qualitative shift in the understanding of societies 
as collectively and politically-(auto)instituted formations that are irreducible 
to inter-subjectivity or systemic logics. After marking out the contours of the 
fi eld and recounting a philosophical history of the imagination (including 
deliberations on the reproductive and creative imaginations, as well as consid-
eration of contemporary Japanese contributions), the essay turns to debates on 
social imaginaries in more concrete contexts, specifi cally political-economic 
imaginaries, the ecological imaginary, multiple modernities and their inter-
civilisational encounters. Th e social imaginaries fi eld imparts powerful mes-
sages for the human sciences and wider publics. In particular, social imagi-
naries hold signifi cant implications for ontological, phenomenological and 
philosophical anthropological questions; for the cultural, social, and political 
horizons of contemporary worlds; and for ecological and economic phenom-
ena (including their manifest crises). Th e essay concludes with the argument 
that social imaginaries as a paradigm-in-the-making off ers valuable means by 
which movements towards social change can be elucidated as well providing 
an open horizon for the critiques of existing social practices. 
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Introduction
Our approach to the emergent fi eld of social imaginaries involves two sig-
nifi cant moves. Th e fi rst is to recognise that debates on social imaginaries have 
progressed to the point where it is possible to distinguish an overall ‘fi eld’ that 
address central problematics of social and political life. Th e vitality of the fi eld 
can be attributed in some part to the variety of intellectual sources informing 
it, as well as to the richness of those sources. We understand the works of Cor-
nelius Castoriadis, Paul Ricoeur, and Charles Taylor to be the cornerstones of 
the fi eld. Th is very diversity of approaches becomes a basis for further refl ec-
tion and debate on the theoretical articulation of social imaginaries; indeed, 
the social imaginaries fi eld has been enriched through its very heterogeneity. 
Subsequently, it has become possible to discuss ecological, global or cosmo-
politan and other emergent imaginaries – as, for example, the participants in 
the roundtable discussion on modern social imaginaries in the current issue 
do (Calhoun et al. 2015).
Th e second move is to argue that the emergence of social imaginaries as a 
‘paradigm-in-the-making’, to borrow a term from Johann P. Arnason, marks 
a qualitative shift in the way that social, cultural and political phenomena are 
understood and problematised. Investigations into social imaginaries redefi ne 
overarching ontological, epistemological and anthropological problematics, 
on the one hand, as well as concrete political and social questions, on the 
other. Th e key interpretative frameworks encountered within the social imagi-
naries fi eld provide rich, non-reductive understandings of the multi-faceted 
aspects of contemporary worlds. Explorations of social imaginaries comprise 
inquiries not only into horizons of cultural meaning that fundamentally shape 
each society (and civilisational complex), but also into their further articula-
tion as instituted (and instituting) cultural projects of power and social doing. 
Most approaches in the fi eld presuppose an understanding of society as a 
political institution, which is formed – and forms itself – in historical constel-
lations, on the one hand, and through encounters with other cultures and 
civilisational worlds, on the other.
Furthermore, explorations of social imaginaries are centrally concerned 
with at least ten interrelated trends. First, social imaginaries emphasise the 
properly social aspect of the imagination instead of reducing it to a faculty 
of the individual mind. Th is is the diff erence between ‘the imaginary’ and 
‘the imagination’ (concomitantly, this can be extended to the diff erence be-
tween ‘rationality’ and ‘reason’). Th is shift can be understood as central to the 
ongoing, albeit incomplete, hermeneutical turn in the human sciences. Sec-
ond, social imaginaries grasp the imagination as authentically creative rather 
than as merely reproductive or imitative. Th is, third, involves a shift from a 
one-sided focus on ‘reason’ as the central tenet (or promise) of modernity, 
and instead posits modernity as a fi eld of tensions co-instituted by cultural 
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varieties of imaginaries and rationalities. Th is is not to say, fourth, that reason 
is rejected; indeed, the more sophisticated theoretical approaches to social 
imaginaries also do justice to varieties of rationality and public reason. In this 
vein, the practice of logon didonai remains central to all forms of thoughtful 
doing and philosophical elucidation. Fifth, modernity’s constitutive tension 
between reason and imagination is best elucidated as competing versions of 
‘worldhood’ off ered by Enlightenment and Romantic cultural currents. Ex-
tending this further, sixth, the question of the varieties of worldhood – and/
or world alienation – in modernity (and multiple modernities) becomes a 
problematic in its own right. Th e problematic of the world has been a long 
standing theme of phenomenology, and is an emergent theme in recent socio-
political thought. In taking up the phenomenological question of the world, 
approaches to social imaginaries open onto interrogations of the ontological 
and anthropological pre-conditions of human modes of being in-the-world. 
Seventh, social imaginaries focus on collectively instituted – and instituting 
– forms of meaning. Because meaning is social (and not reducible to inter-
subjectivity), this involves an elucidation of the properly trans-subjective as-
pect of socio-cultural activity – in the form of meaning, action, and power 
– as the precondition for inter-subjective modes of being-in-the-world. Th e 
trans-subjective aspect of society is what Castoriadis terms the anonymous col-
lective, and is matched to an understanding of the world as an overarching, 
trans-objective horizon. In this way, the main approaches to social imaginaries 
radicalise the critique of the subject/object division that was central to early 
phenomenological analyses by extending it to the properly societal dimension 
of the human condition. Eighth, social imaginaries – as cultural articulations 
of the world – elucidate cultures (in the anthropological not aesthetic sense) as 
open rather than closed. In this way, a richer understanding of human societ-
ies’ encounter not only with other cultures and civilisations, but also with the 
world can be developed. Th e human encounter with the world requires it to 
be put into meaning (as world formation). Such approaches posit a minimum 
commonality to the human condition writ large but emphasise its historical 
diversity as distinct civilizational articulations of the world. Th is allows for the 
human condition to be understood as a unity in a plurality, whilst the accent 
on the twofold aspect of meaning (its ‘sociality’ and ‘worldhood’) necessi-
tates a rethinking of philosophical anthropological notions of culture beyond 
socio-centric reductionism (c.f. Arnason 1993; Adams 2011a). In this way, 
social imaginaries lends itself to analyses of the human condition in its inter-
cultural and inter-civilisational varieties, on the one hand, and to comparative 
civilisational analyses of formations and encounters, on the other. Ninth, as 
social imaginaries takes society to be a political institution, it emphasises the 
situated nature and collective forms of social interaction, in particular regard-
ing democratic politics and the capitalist market economy, whilst, in a related 
vein, tenth, it does not reduce analyses of social formations and projects of 
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power to normative considerations alone. Th is is closely related to the neces-
sity of strengthening debates on political (understood in Castoriadis’s strong 
sense of ‘la politique’), and not just ethical responses to our current world 
situation (including crises of the environment, democracy and the capitalist 
market imaginary). Th us, in problematising the human condition in moder-
nity (and indeed the many modernities of our times) in light of the above 
inter-related trends, interpretations of social imaginaries constitute a powerful 
fi eld of debate. 
We begin this essay by reconstructing the most important theoretical ar-
ticulations of social imaginaries, and then contextualising them within the 
broader fi eld. Th e modern understanding of the imagination as authentically 
creative is one of the pre-conditions for contemporary elucidations of social 
imaginaries; in this context, we then take measure of the philosophical history 
of the imagination. Following on from that, we concretise our discussion by 
investigating key approaches to political, democratic, economic and ecologi-
cal imaginaries. We conclude with an outline of the common ground between 
the fi elds of social imaginaries and civilisational analysis.
I. Th eorising Social Imaginaries
Th e social imaginaries fi eld is very heterogeneous. Th ere are a number of 
possible reasons for this: there is a range of intellectual sources and currents 
that inform debates on social imaginaries, but specifi c perspectives tend to be 
advanced without real acknowledgment of – or engagement with – this diver-
sity, and the concomitant fi eld of tensions that it engenders. Th ese intellec-
tual sources range from the sociological tradition, beginning with Durkheim’s 
(1976 [1912]) notion of collective representations (as distinct from the collective 
conscience) and including Benedict Anderson’s (1991 [1983]) neo-Durkheim-
ian approach to imagined communities, to (especially Francophone) phenom-
enological currents of thought, articulated, for example, in Sartre’s (1962, 
1966 [1944]) distinction between the imaginary and the imagination, and 
in Merleau-Ponty’s hesitations about the mode of being of the imaginary in 
his later work, to approaches infl uenced by hermeneutic-phenomenological 
problematics, such as the three thinkers under consideration here: Ricoeur’s 
(1986) work on the social imaginary of ideology and utopia, Taylor’s (2004) 
post-Merleau-Pontian understanding of the background horizon of meaning, 
and Castoriadis’s (1987 [1975]) critical engagement with Merleau-Pontian – 
and to a lesser extent, Sartrean – approaches to the (social) imaginary. Lacan’s 
legacy for social imaginaries is mixed but cannot be ignored. He brought the 
term ‘imaginary’ into common academic parlance (as part of his tripartite 
understanding of psychical structures: the symbolic/the imaginary/the real), 
but his articulation of the imaginary can also be seen as a psychoanalytic re-
sponse to Sartre’s earlier elucidation of the imaginary and the imagination 
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(Lacan 1977). Some thinkers who are associated with the social imaginar-
ies fi eld, however, especially those who work more explicitly in relation to 
political imaginaries (such as Claude Lefort or Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouff e) fruitfully engage with aspects of his thought. Here it is instructive 
to note the importance of Freud for Ricoeur and Castoriadis’s respective un-
derstandings of the creative imagination in relation to dreams and meaning, 
but strictly speaking the psychical domain is quite separate from the region 
of social imaginaries, and thus is of lesser relevance in the present context. Fi-
nally, historical interpretations of ideology have been linked to the imaginary 
(and more broadly, the symbolic) and this has been infl uential for the social 
imaginaries fi eld, for example, in Ricoeur (1986) and Lefort’s (1986) thought.
Th is essay identifi es the three most signifi cant articulations of social imagi-
naries to be those by Cornelius Castoriadis (1987), Paul Ricoeur (1986), and 
Charles Taylor (2004), respectively. Castoriadis had been writing on social 
imaginary signifi cations since the mid-1950s; his ‘fi rst attempt’1 at systemati-
cally elucidating social imaginaries occurred in the mid-1960s (although his 
preferred term is social imaginary signifi cations); and his mature elucidation of 
social imaginary signifi cations – and his concomitant turn to ontology – be-
gan from the early 1970s. Th ese two attempts were published in his magnum 
opus, L’Institution imaginaire de la société in 1975. In the same year, Ricoeur 
presented two series of seminars at Chicago University. Th e fi rst was his now 
famous lectures on ideology and utopia (1986), which comprise the two poles 
of the cultural imagination; the other seminar series was on the philosophy of 
the imagination, more generally.2 Ricoeur used the term social imaginary un-
systematically; he more often employed concepts, such as ‘ideology’, ‘utopia’, 
or ‘cultural imagination’ to refer to these ‘practical fi ctions’. Th e actual term 
social imaginaries was popularised almost three decades later with the publica-
tion of Charles Taylor’s Modern Social Imaginaries (2002, 2004); here Taylor 
was infl uenced by Branislow Baczko’s earlier work (1984; c.f. Abbey 2006). 
Each of the above mentioned three thinkers anchored his account of social 
imaginaries in understandings of the modern imagination as both creative and 
social, although the contrasts between them cannot be overstated (we return 
to the philosophical question of the imagination in the next section below). 
Put simply, theories of social imaginaries elucidate the ways in which cul-
tural confi gurations of meaning creatively confi gure the human encounter 
with – and formation (as articulation and doing) of – the world, on the one 
hand, and, articulate their centrality for the emergence, formation and re-
production of social institutions and practices, that is, of social change and 
social continuity, on the other. To paraphrase Castoriadis: society itself is an 
imaginary institution. A central innovation of the social imaginaries fi eld has 
been to connect the formation of meaning to the creative imagination (or 
more specifi cally: to the imaginary element). It is important to note, how-
ever, that social imaginaries are irreducible to meaning alone. Th e three main 
 20 Suzi Adams, Paul Blokker, Natalie J. Doyle
approaches to social imaginaries identifi ed herein variously incorporate other 
dimensions of the human condition as well, such as power, action/social do-
ing, and/ or institutions.
Th e emphasis on the imagination is in sharp contrast to the more conven-
tional focus placed on the import of reason/rationality for modernity. Indeed, 
the tension between reason and imagination is central to the institution of 
cultural modernity (and understandings of the human condition within it). 
One of the key aspects of the modern imagination is that it is understood to 
be fundamentally and authentically creative (or productive) – not just repro-
ductive or imitative (we return to a more detailed discussion of the history 
of the imagination below). More specifi cally, social imaginaries highlight the 
imaginary element of the human condition instead of the imagination as a 
faculty of the singular human being. As Arnason has argued, the still partial 
shift to the imaginary is to be understood as an ongoing but incomplete her-
meneutical shift from the imagination to the imaginary and, concomitantly, 
from reason to rationality. It is worth quoting him in full on this point: 
To shift our notions of reason and imagination in this direction would be to 
relate them more closely to the constitution and appropriation of meaning to 
patterns of world-interpretation, and to the space that is thus opened up for 
interpretative confl icts. More specifi cally, the hermeneutical transformation 
referred to above would entail a revision of dominant preconceptions: if we 
still tend to think of reason and imagination primarily as abilities or compe-
tences – reason as the ability to ground and justify to fi nd and give reasons 
imagination as the ability to envisage and fantasise to grasp and generate im-
ages – we may have to learn to think of them as dimension or elements (in the 
sense that Bachelard, Merleau-Ponty and Castoriadis have given to the term 
‘element’) i.e. as aspects or component of culture more precisely of the cultural 
articulations of the world (Arnason 1994, p. 155).
Clearly Arnason is working towards a cultural hermeneutics but one that is 
grafted onto phenomenology; specifi cally, a post-transcendental phenomenol-
ogy that takes the problematic of the world horizon in its trans-subjective/
trans-objective interlacing, as a question in its own right. 
Despite the richness of their accounts – and the rapid proliferation of 
the social imaginaries fi eld, more broadly – scant attention has been given 
to critical comparisons of Castoriadis, Ricoeur and Taylor’s perspectives on 
social imaginaries. Th ere are very few exceptions: Graham Ward (2005) has 
given an overview of their respective approaches to social imaginaries in re-
lation to cultural change and religious practice; Johann Michel (2013) has 
recently brought Castoriadis and Ricoeur into dialogue on the question of 
social imaginaries and institutions; Suzi Adams (2011) has discussed the re-
spective approaches of Ricoeur and Castoriadis to creation and interpretation 
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(2011b); Karl Smith (2010) has compared Castoriadis and Taylor’s accounts 
of subjectivity and the self in modernity, but his focus was not social imagi-
naries per se; Meili Steele (2003) has critically discussed Taylor and Ricoeur’s 
approaches to language and narrative, but, again, the question of social imagi-
naries was not the central concern. On a more general level, Claudia Strauss’s 
(2006) rather one sided account of ‘the imaginary’ includes a discussion of 
Castoriadis and Taylor but her interest in psychological aspects precludes a 
constructive engagement with key tenants of the social imaginaries fi eld. John 
Grant (2014) has recently criticised the ‘imaginaries’ fi eld for neglecting the 
properly political dimension, but he focuses only on three North American 
accounts, reduces Castoriadis to a footnote, and excludes mention of Ricoeur 
altogether, which is perplexing given Ricoeur and Castoriadis’s central grap-
pling with various aspects of socio-political imaginaries with which Grant 
concerns himself (we return to the question of political imaginaries, below). 
Th ere is, however, a very interesting, albeit indirect, encounter on the ques-
tion of the social imaginary to be found in eminent Ricoeur scholar, Richard 
Kearney’s interview with Charles Taylor (Kearney and Taylor 2007). Th ere is 
moreover a record of a direct encounter between Ricoeur and Castoriadis in 
1982 on Radio France (Culture).3 Whilst this discussion focussed more on 
the question of the imagination as creative/ productive/ interpretative, it also 
touches on issues concerning social imaginaries.Each of the three theorists 
under consideration clearly emphasises the importance of the imaginary di-
mension for the human condition (in modernity), but they do so in diff erent 
ways. We shift our attention now to consider each in turn.
Castoriadis’s mature work elucidates social imaginary signifi cations in on-
tological terms. Th e social-historical as the radical imaginary of instituting 
society, creates a world of meaning – as, in, and through social imaginary 
signifi cations – ex nihilo, through and as which we encounter/institute ‘real-
ity’. Th is forms the background horizon for the confi guration of key institu-
tions of each society. He writes: ‘Th e institution of society is in each case the 
institution of a magma of social imaginary signifi cations, which we can and 
must call a world of signifi cations’ (Castoriadis 1987, p. 359; emphasis in 
original). Social imaginary signifi cations ‘create a proper world for the society 
considered – in fact, they are this world’ (1994, p. 152, emphasis in original; 
see also Castoriadis’s contribution to this issue: Castoriadis 2015). Castoria-
dis’s shift to ontology in the early 1970s was in order to elucidate the mode 
of being underlying collective autonomy (particularly in the form of direct 
democracy) as self-creating, and, simultaneously, as a critique of theories of 
society that reduce it to frameworks of determinacy, such as systemic logics. 
After his critique of Marx, Castoriadis reactivated ancient Greek images of di-
rect democracy – that is, a society that understands itself to be self-instituting 
and as such does not attribute its form, laws, culture and customs to an extra-
social source, such as God, and that recognises the need to institute collective 
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self-limitation – in his rethinking of the project of autonomy. On his account, 
the ancient Greeks created – brought into being – democracy as a new form 
(eidos) of society. Th is has weighty ontological implications: human societies 
create ontological form. Castoriadis’s ontology is thus, as Dick Howard (1988) 
has termed it, a political ontology, properly understood. If autonomy was Cas-
toriadis’s enduring political project (he identifi ed as a revolutionary long after 
his critique of Marx and the disbanding of Socialisme ou Barbarie), then the is-
sue of human creation was his most enduring philosophical problematic. Th e 
previously noted modern tension between imagination and reason plays out 
on the ontological level for Castoriadis. His ontology of the radical imaginary 
as instituting society forms a key part of his critique of the presuppositions of 
traditional western philosophy, specifi cally the understanding of being as de-
terminacy and identitary logic (or as he called it ensemblistic-identitary logic). 
In this he is part of a broad current of thought that critiques the metaphysics 
of presence, along with thinkers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida. 
Central to understanding Castoriadis’s approach to social imaginary signi-
fi cations is his connection between time and creation, on the one hand, and 
time as social-historical time, on the other. In brief this refers to his rejection 
of time as quantitative and measurable (the ‘spatialisation of time’, as he calls 
it) and the development of a qualitative notion of time as the social-historical 
auto-creation of ontological otherness, as the emergence of new forms – such 
as the ancient Greek creation of democracy – and the rejection of ‘abstract 
time’ as devoid of concrete content. Th us time is the creation of new onto-
logical forms (eide) in and as history. Th ese overarching forms are then open 
to a plurality of further articulations, such as ancient Greek democracy in, for 
example, its Spartan, Athenian, and Corinthian variants, or modern capital-
ism in its English, German or Japanese varieties.
Castoriadis’s approach to social imaginary signifi cations plays out not only 
on the ontological level but also on the cultural hermeneutic level: concrete 
articulations of the world are activated through their articulation in – and as 
– key social institutions. Th us, for Castoriadis, modernity is a dual institution 
comprising the central social imaginary signifi cations of autonomy and the 
infi nite pursuit of (pseudo) rational mastery. Th ese social imaginary signifi ca-
tions underpin the institutions – and their interwoven social practices – of, 
for example, democracy, on the one hand, and bureaucracy and capitalism, 
on the other. Here the main point is that Castoriadis understands these social 
practices/ institutions as articulations, or concrete manifestations, of broader 
imaginary signifi cations that fundamentally shape the modern human condi-
tion in-the-world (See Arnason’s essay in this issue: Arnason 2015). 
Like Castoriadis, Ricoeur draws on the specifi cally modern understand-
ing of the productive imagination to articulate the social imaginary – specifi -
cally in its open dialectic with the reproductive imagination, which he identi-
fi es as the core of ideology and utopia (1986). Th e ideological imagination 
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reproduces an image that society has of itself (usually a founding image/
myth), whilst the utopian imagination produces alternative images of society 
that put ideological images into question. For Ricoeur, the social imaginary is 
a product of the cultural imagination in its ideological and utopian variants 
(these roughly correspond to Castoriadis’s understanding of instituted soci-
ety and instituting society) and these overlap in his thought with the social 
and political imagination. Ricoeur understands the social imaginary as ‘the 
touchstone of the practical function of the imagination’ (1994, p. 118), in 
contrast to its theoretical mode (although the utopian imagination is situ-
ated more at the intersection of theory and practice). In the lectures, Ricoeur 
undertakes a rich hermeneutic of the ideological and utopian poles of the 
imagination (1986). As the emphasis is on practical life, Ricoeur focuses on 
a hermeneutical phenomenology of action both as symbolic and as anchored 
in symbolic contexts. He writes: ‘Ideology and utopia have ultimately to do 
with the character of human action as being mediated, structured and inte-
grated by symbolic systems’ (1976, p. 512). In addition, and unlike Castoria-
dis, Ricoeur explicitly includes an analysis of power in his understanding of 
the cultural imagination.4 Although Ricoeur had developed his own account 
of action in relation to symbolic systems, he enriched it further through an 
intensive engagement with Cliff ord Geertz’s (1973) notion of ‘symbolic ac-
tion’ and ‘symbolic systems’, coupled with Mannheim’s (1954 [1929]) insight 
of ideology and utopia’s ‘non-congruence’ with social reality. Ricoeur wants to 
delineate both the polarity between each term, as well as the ‘functional’ and 
‘pathological’ or ‘distorted’ modalities that both ideology and utopia can take. 
In the case of ideology, this can mean the concealment of hidden interests; for 
utopia it means eschewing the necessity of action in favour of escapism into 
the ‘empty space of ‘nowhere’’ (1976, p. 22). Ricoeur goes on to argue that 
ideological ‘distortion’ of social reality is only possible if social reality is always 
already symbolised (and symbolising). In its functional sense, ideology repro-
duces society’s image of itself; it maintains collective identity and cohesion; its 
role is to legitimate and integrate society’s representation of itself. Where the 
ideological imagination is conservative, the utopian imagination is subversive. 
In its positive aspect, utopia problematises the instituted order of society, and 
off ers a counter-world characterised by alternative confi gurations of power in 
its search for ‘the possible’ as opposed to the ‘given’. 
Ricoeur’s focus on human action is in line with his overall philosophical 
anthropology that takes the ‘capable self ’ as its basis. However, the capable 
self acts within – and draws on and interprets – socio-cultural contexts, and 
it is here that Ricoeur’s version of the imaginary element as trans-subjective 
emerges. Ricoeur’s approach to the imaginary element is anchored in his 
theory of linguistic meaning, and occurs at the intersection of its symbolic, 
metaphoric and narrative versions. Unlike Castoriadis, Ricoeur does not make 
a formal distinction between symbolic and imaginary elements of meaning: 
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for him, the social imaginary is ‘an ensemble of symbolic discourses’ that can 
‘function as a rupture or a reaffi  rmation’ (1991a, p. 475), that is the activity 
of the socio-cultural imagination as it pertains to the practical domain; the 
imaginary element is a given society’s ‘hidden mytho-poetic nucleus’ (1991b, 
p. 483).
Unlike Castoriadis and Ricoeur, Charles Taylor’s approach to social imagi-
naries was not developed solo but in loose collaboration with the Centre for 
Transcultural Studies, including, for example, Craig Calhoun, Dilip Gaonkar, 
Benjamin Lee, and Michael Warner (see their collective contribution to this 
issue: Calhoun et al. 2015). Th e associated journal, Public Culture, published 
a special issue on New Imaginaries (Lee & Gaonkar 2002), to which Taylor 
contributed the essay ‘Modern Social Imaginaries’ (2002). He reworked the 
essay into what is arguably the best known text in the social imaginaries fi eld 
tout court –– Modern Social Imaginaries (2004) –– and then developed the 
framework further still in sections of A Secular Age (2007). Articulated as part 
of an overall approach to multiple modernities, Taylor’s account, like the de-
bates on multiple modernities and civilisational analysis spearheaded by S.N. 
Eisenstadt (2003) and Arnason (2003), argues for a cultural approach to mo-
dernity and its multiplication (Taylor 1999).Modern Social Imaginaries does 
not specifi cally deal with multiple modernities however; rather, it seeks to 
articulate a self-understanding of the modern western social imaginary from 
which inter-civilisational variants can then be further elaborated in an open 
dialectic of self- and other-understanding (we return to this thematic in the 
fi nal section of this essay).
Taylor does not explicitly engage with Castoriadis or Ricoeur’s earlier ac-
counts of social imaginaries; instead his key intellectual sources include Bene-
dict Anderson’s (1991) notion of ‘imagined communities’, and, as mentioned 
above, Bronislaw Baczko’s (1984) approach to social imaginaries. Taylor’s ver-
sion reworks the tension of reason and imagination in modernity by main-
taining that he was not providing a theory of social imaginaries; the social 
imaginary is ‘not a set of ideas; rather it is what enables, through making 
sense of, the practices of society’ (2004, p. 2). Key aspects here to note include 
the centrality of meaning-making to social imaginaries, coupled with already 
instituted forms of social doing (rather than openings towards rupture and 
social change), and the emphasis on the collective dimension of society (rather 
than the on the self, as was most notably the case in Sources of the Self (1989), 
although he has always rejected individualist and atomist social ontologies). 
His long interest in the phenomenological themes of practical know-how and 
implicit knowledge infl uence his understanding of social imaginaries. Al-
though Taylor traces the advent of social imaginaries through key philosophi-
cal-theoretical articulations by such thinkers as Locke, Grotius, Rousseau and 
Tocqueville, his aim is rather to assert their common bedrock in everyday life 
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as well as what underlies an (admittedly fragile) sense of unity dispersed across 
geographical space (in the vein of Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’).
Finally, Taylor elucidates three spheres of social practices that institute mo-
dernity and which draw on the horizon of the social imaginary for meaning 
and legitimation: First, popular sovereignty and collective self-governance, 
which points to the prior existence of society to the polity, and the importance 
of common agency; second, economic practices of, in particular, the market 
economy, which is depicted as private and without a sense of common agency; 
and, third, the public sphere which sits external to the polity but internal to 
society and highlights the answerability of the former to the latter. 
Although Castoriadis elucidates social imaginary signifi cations at the on-
tological level, his hermeneutic of modernity – and the political project of 
autonomy, more broadly – brings his account of social imaginaries into prac-
tical life in line with Ricoeur and Taylor’s approach. Both Ricoeur and Cas-
toriadis place considerable emphasis on the creative/productive imagination 
elucidated by Kant and the Frühromantiker, and seek to rework its implica-
tions, whereas this is of less concern for Taylor. Both Castoriadis and Ricoeur 
are interested in instituted/ reproductive forms of the social imaginary, as 
well as the rupturing/instituting aspect, but where Castoriadis is most inter-
ested to elucidate the radical instituting imaginary, Ricoeur, in his seminars 
on social imaginaries (1986), devotes fourteen lectures to ideology and only 
three to utopia (but it is relevant to note that he meditates on some of the 
utopian aspects of the imagination via the poetic imagination which he car-
ries out in other works). Both Taylor and Ricoeur have an explicit interest in 
hermeneutics and narrative, and both tend to equate social imaginaries with 
a sense of the symbolic, whereas for Castoriadis the symbolic is essential for 
the imaginary element, but the imaginary forms the precondition of symbolic 
networks. Although, Castoriadis’s approach to social imaginary signifi cations 
arguably incorporates a hermeneutical dimension (Arnason 2015; Adams 
2011), he himself explicitly rejects this aspect. Th is informs his disagreement 
with Ricoeur regarding the productive imagination versus the creative imagi-
nation, and Ricoeur’s insistence on the hermeneutical aspect of production 
(and more broadly, the open dialectic between reproductive and productive 
aspects of the imagination).5 Th e hermeneutical dimension also points to the 
question of the imagination as a key aspect of philosophical modernity’s ‘fi eld 
of tensions’ (Arnason 1991), to which we now turn.
II. History of the Imagination 
Th e social imaginary as a philosophical concept is related to the imagina-
tion itself both in terms of its meaning and its historical context. For its his-
torical inception we can look back to Aristotle’s discovery of the imagination 
(phantasia). Th e imagination here as the requirement for thought is passive 
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(pathos), functioning in relation to the power of sensation (Aristotle 1986, 
Book 3). As a consequence the Greek tradition has taken the imagination to 
be fundamentally imitative or reproductive of sense perception. But because 
the sensible object’s activity upon the imagination is mediated by the senses, 
the imagination escapes its full constraint to become active and creative to 
an extent. Th is makes it potentially deviant, a source of error as we fi nd later 
in René Descartes’s devaluation of the imagination. Yet more recent thinkers 
have noted something about that creativity of the imagination that never re-
ally won its proper place within the Western philosophical tradition, an im-
plicit poiesis although Aristotle himself never makes the connection between 
phantasia and poiesis.
Th at creative or productive function of the imagination becomes pro-
nounced in modern philosophy with Immanuel Kant. Creativity at least in 
its epistemic signifi cance – and eventually in its ontological signifi cance for 
the Romantic tradition and the German idealists – becomes a function of the 
human mind and no longer confi ned to divinity.6 In Kant, who jumpstarts 
this move, the imagination (Einbildungskraft) is an a priori faculty of intuition 
that is productive (produktive) or active (tätiges) (1965/1993, p. A118, A120), 
rather than passive.7 But the centrality of its creativity Kant underscores in 
the fi rst edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernuft is subsequently reduced and 
submerged under the dictates of reason in the second edition.
In the fi rst edition of the Critique, Kant describes the imagination as one 
of the original sources of all experience that itself cannot ‘be derived from 
any other faculty of the mind’ (1965/1993, p. A94). He speaks of its a priori 
transcendental synthesis as antecedent to all experience and ‘conditioning 
the very possibility of all experience’ (1965/1993, p. A101), allowing for the 
empirical application of the categories of the understanding to the sense im-
pressions we receive (1965/1993, p. A125). In this way it brings sensibility 
and understanding, intuitions and concepts, together. On this basis he makes 
the implicit suggestion that the imagination is actually the ‘common, but to 
us unknown, root’ of sensibility and understanding (1965/1993, p. B29, p. 
B863). As the power of synthesis in general, the imagination as such is ‘a blind 
but indispensable function of the human soul’ necessary for cognition (Kant 
1965/1993, p. A78/B103).
Another defi nition of the imagination Kant provides is that it is ‘the fac-
ulty to represent in intuition an object even without its presence’ (1965/1993, 
p. B151). Th is can refer to the reproductive sense of the imagination when 
one has an image of what one has seen. But it can also refer to its productive 
aspect if what is produced is something one has not perceived. Despite its 
placement as the mediator between the receptivity of sense impressions and 
the spontaneity of conceptual understanding, there is an active-creative com-
ponent here belonging to the side of spontaneity.8 Th e process of the schema-
tism in the second edition underscores this a priori formative feature of the 
 Social Imaginaries in Debate 27
imagination as ‘an art concealed in the depths of the soul’ (Kant 1965/1993, 
p. B180). Th e schematism provides rules for producing images for concepts. 
With the concept of ‘dog’, or ‘triangle’, for example, the schematism delin-
eates its fi gure in a general manner without delimiting it to the determinate 
image a particular experience (of a dog or a triangle) might present (Kant 
1965/1993, p. B180). Th ereby it represents that which is not itself present, 
not an image – the schema.9 Hannah Arendt (1992 [1982], pp. 80, 84-85), 
more recently, has noticed how an analogous sort of creativity can be found 
in the construction of exemplary rules in the historical or political domains,10 
and Ricoeur (1994, pp. 112-123; c.f. 1986) has interpreted this more gener-
ally as metaphorical attribution that gives image to meaning.
In the end, though, Kant retreats from that primacy of the imagination as 
a creative power of synthesis, which may entail uncertainties, and relegates it 
to a more secondary status, subordinate to epistemic concerns. Th is becomes 
evident in the second edition of the fi rst Critique, as has been noted by some.11 
Th e potentially unbounded creativity of the imagination – along with its his-
torical or temporal contingency as later noted by Heidegger and Castoriadis 
– become tightly fettered to the laws reason lays down a priori for the sake of 
true cognition.
But what was circumscribed within cognitive bounds in the fi rst Critique 
is given a somewhat looser rein in the Kritik der Urteilskraft (Kant 1952) 
within the realm of aesthetics. Kant gives the imagination, in its ‘free activ-
ity’ or ‘free play’ (Kant 1952, pp. 122-123, 212), an artistic role beyond the 
epistemic domain in the productive capacity of the genius to create the unseen 
and thus reorder reality (Kant 1952: §§46-47, 49). Exceeding the bounds of 
conceptuality, the aesthetic product of genius cannot be fully translated into 
language or symbols and induces in its audience an experience that likewise 
exceeds linguistic and conceptual boundaries. 
Kant problematises that unconstrained creative activity of the imagination 
further with the introduction of the sublime. In the sublime one experiences 
awe and anxiety before the powers of nature or humanity that transcend the 
bounds of any purposiveness. Th e imagination’s creative dimension here is 
loosened from its cognitive function and expanded in pursuit of reason’s idea 
of infi nity, but which, moving beyond reasonable limits, moves to inevitably 
exceed any sense of purpose that reason assigns to things – whether our own 
humanity or to nature (Kant 1952, §§23-28; c.f. Rundell 1994, pp. 103-
104). Th e sublime points to that creative unboundedness of the imagination 
perceived externally while genius is the bearer of that creativity within to give 
it aesthetic expression. Both the sublime and genius underscore the creativity 
of the imagination irreducible to the terms of reason and understanding in the 
cognitive or theoretical sphere, and problematises its communicability. On 
the other hand Kant does attempt to fetter that creativity with his notion of 
taste as socialised for ‘universal approval’ under the faculty of judgment (Kant 
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1952, §50; c.f. Rundell 1994, pp. 106, 116 n.66), which in turn, however, 
opens the question of historicity and contingency underlying communal taste 
and with which the imagination engages in hermeneutical dialogue.
After Kant, the German Romantics and Idealists take up the theme of the 
creative imagination. Th e productivity Kant discovered begins to replace that 
of divine creation to fully fl ower in Schelling, for whom the imagination is an 
organ of nature, expressing its creativity through our unconscious, ultimately 
transcending individual subjectivity and its fi nitude (Roberts 1994, p. 173). A 
little later Heidegger, by contrast, reads Kantian imagination in the opposite 
direction centring on human fi nitude.
Heidegger focuses upon the imagination’s formative capacity (Vermögen 
des Bildes) (Heidegger 1977, p. 278; 1990, p. 89; 1991, p. 128; 1997, p. 
189) as indicated in the German einbilden, literally, ‘to in-form’, ‘to form 
in(to)’. Radicalising the sense of our being-situated in the world, he ontolo-
gises the imagination beyond its epistemic functions. His Kant reading of the 
1920s, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik of 1929 but also Phänomenolo-
gische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft of 1927-28, takes 
Kant’s imagination that brings together sensibility and intelligibility (Hei-
degger 1990, pp. 103, 121; 1991, pp. 153, 177), especially as indicated in 
its time-formation and the schematism, to be derivative of – in some sense 
even identical with – the temporality (Zeitlichkeit) of human existence that 
constitutes the horizon of comportment analysed in Sein und Zeit in the sense 
that our cognitive concerns are ultimately and tacitly guided by our existen-
tial concerns, our concern for being in the face of death. Th e latter allows for 
and guides our projection of a world-Bild (world-picture or image) as the 
contextual horizon or ‘pre-form/view’ (Vor-Bild) in light of which things can 
manifest for us and be meaningful (Heidegger 1969, pp. 88-89; 1990, p. 99; 
1991, pp. 144-45; 1998, pp. 122-123). Einbildungskraft in its Bildung of a 
Bild is thus broadened as ontologically constitutive of our being-in-the-world. 
But its creativity in the formation (bilden) of the horizon is inextricably linked 
to – even derivative of – human fi nitude, lived temporality as the ultimate 
horizon of mortal existence.
In his later (post-1930) works Heidegger either demotes the imagination 
as a representational faculty belonging, as an epochal feature, to modernity; 
or furthers its ontological broadening, radicalising it in terms of the clear-
ing event (Lichtung, Ereignis) or poiesis of being that opens the world and 
human existence.12 Common to both is a further downplaying of the spon-
taneity of human subjectivity. Finitude and receptivity in human existence 
become even more pronounced. In Beiträge zur Philosophie of 1936-38, for 
example, the imagination is no longer a transcendental faculty of the soul, ‘…
but rather event [Ereignis] itself… as the occurrence of the clearing [Lichtung] 
itself ’ (Heidegger 1994, p. GA 65: 312; 1999, p. 219). Here the imagination 
as the unfolding of being is released from confi nement to the human subject, 
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instead understood as the process of ontological formation in the confi gur-
ings of unconcealing-concealing. Die Zeit des Weltbildes (1938), on the other 
hand, historicises the imagination as a station in ‘the history of the forgetful-
ness of being’ (Heidegger 2003). Parallel to the modern self-deifi cation of 
consciousness, the world as a totality of beings becomes represented through 
the imagination – Einbildungskraft – in a picture or image, Bild, thus objecti-
fi ed by man, in the modern age (Heidegger 2002, pp. 69-70, 76; 2003, pp. 
92-93). And during the 1950s, Heidegger speaks of imagings or imaginings in 
the plural – Ein-Bildungen (‘in-formations’) – as the ‘poietic’ occurrence of be-
ing that brings to human beings the measure of dwelling and to which poetry 
responds (c.f. Sallis 1990). ‘Poetry’ in its deeper ontological signifi cance as 
poiesis speaks in ‘images’ or ‘forms’ (Bilder) – the provision of an ontological 
measure – and thus involves ‘imaginings’ (Ein-Bildungen) of sorts (Heidegger 
1971, pp. 225-226; 2000, pp. 204-205). Th e imagination as ontological or 
‘poetic’– dichterische Einbildungskraft (Heidegger 1985, p. 17; 1971, p. 197) – 
sounds from a source beyond human subjectivity. Hence the ‘free’ spontaneity 
of the imagination in Heidegger’s last phase ultimately comes to refer to the 
anonymous opening of being wherein the human being-(t)here is thrown, 
opened, and grounded.
Th e notion of a creative imagination has developed in other disparate ways 
throughout the twentieth century in diff erent corners of the world. Castoria-
dis credits Sigmund Freud’s analysis of the unconscious and its psychic cre-
ativity as ‘an important but unacknowledged rediscovery of the imagination’ 
(Castoriadis, 1987, p. 281; c.f. 1994, p.136). Th e American pragmatist phi-
losopher John Dewey conceived the imagination (e.g., in A Common Faith, 
1962 [1934]) as a faculty that projects ideals and values, off ering possibili-
ties and motivations for thought and action, and that provides a picture of 
the whole, serving to secure a sense of community and communion with the 
universe.
Th e power of the imagination as creative and constitutive of human social 
existence has been recognised in East Asia as well. In World War Two Japan, 
Miki Kiyoshi in his Kōsōryoku no ronri (Logic of the Imagination) for example 
took the imagination’s creation of images out of emotion, passion, or impulse 
– pathos – to culminate externally in the production – poiesis – of ‘formed 
images’ (keizō) (from the Greek eidos and German Bild) (Miki, 1967a, p. 46; 
1967b, p. 473). As examples he mentions myth, technology, and the institu-
tions (seido) of society, all of which undergo change through the history of hu-
man action. Th e imagination as such expresses the human impulse to act and 
produce by inventing, constructing, and altering reality (Miki, 1967a, pp. 15, 
49; c.f. Miki, 1967b, p. 477). And in post-war Japan, Nakamura Yūjirō, who 
looks to Miki as a predecessor, discusses the same sort of social collective cre-
ativity that forms the world in terms of ‘common sense’ (kyōtsū kankaku). Tak-
ing off  from Aristotle’s koinē aisthēsis and Vico’s sensus communis, and referring 
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to Kant’s Gemeinsinn from the third Critique, Nakamura in Kyōtsūkankakuron 
(On Common Sense, 1983) develops an understanding of ‘common sense’ as 
the way in which the various senses are integrated at the point where the 
senses and reason meet. As such it is in phase with the imagination and is 
constitutive of a communal horizon of meaning, making judgment and com-
munication possible. Nakamura associates common sense with the creativity 
of the imagination in Miki, and in this association we may fi nd possible reso-
nances with contemporary notions of the social imaginary.
Meanwhile, roughly contemporary to Nakamura, a major thinker in the 
contemporary West who has thematised the creative imagination in its on-
tological signifi cance, while developing the concept of the social imaginary, 
is Cornelius Castoriadis. More generally, Castoriadis utilises the notion of 
the ‘creative imagination’ as an umbrella term for the more specifi c radical 
imagination of the psyche, on the one hand, and the radical imaginary of 
the social-historical (as social imaginary signifi cations) on the other. Taking 
off  from Kant’s understanding as well as Aristotle’s, and building on Freud’s 
theory of the unconscious, Castoriadis defi nes the imagination as ‘the power 
to make be that which realiter is not’ (Castoriadis 1994, p. 139; emphasis in 
original; c.f. 1997, pp. 213ff , 246ff ), meaning what is not given whether in 
perception or previously constituted thought. Th e radical imagination (and 
the radical imaginary) – taking radical in its root sense, radix, as originary – is 
a creative force that creates ex nihilo (Castoriadis 2007, p. 73). Th is capacity 
distinguishes, for example, the human psyche from the animal psyche and is 
founded on the fl ux of representational spontaneity at the root of our psyche 
that escapes subordination to any predetermined end. One of Castoriadis’s 
many contributions to the discussion of the imagination is to show that it 
is a ‘spontaneous, creative, afunctional force’ (2007, p. 205). What the cre-
ative imagination creates are images but which are forms – forms of being, 
whether language, institutions, art, and so on (1994, p. 140; 2007, p. 73). In 
its afunctional spontaneity, the creative imagination needs to be tamed but 
the taming is never fully accomplished and it can never be brought under 
complete control. Human activities ‘introduce infi nitesimal alterations’ in the 
imaginary signifi cations thus instituted (2007, p. 109). Th e forms imagina-
tion creates are never complete but allow for alteration and novelty. Th us like 
Heidegger in his reading of the Kantian imagination, Castoriadis emphasises 
temporality as well (c.f. 1987, pp. 372-373). But if Heidegger focuses on the 
fi nitude revealed in the receptivity of the imagination, Castoriadis focuses 
on the autonomy or freedom revealed in the spontaneous fl ux of the radical 
imagination that on the one hand precludes reduction to functionality and 
escapes predetermination, but on the other hand permits creativity, novelty, 
and ruptures.
In the various above-mentioned analyses, starting with Kant, the depth 
of the imagination that begins to open up in its creative signifi cance for the 
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human experience leads to the temporality, historicity, and contingency of 
the transcendental and the a priori. In some cases, it has also opened up onto 
articulations of the social imagination, which is more properly understood 
as the social imaginary (as distinct from the imagination as a faculty of the 
mind). Th e particular tension engendered by modern understandings of the 
imagination and reason – and more particularly in this context, of imaginaries 
and rationalities – plays out further in the socio-political domain, to which 
we now turn.
III. Social Imaginaries and Modernity
I. Political-Economic Imaginaries
Th e notion of political imaginary draws attention to the historical and con-
textual nature of political phenomena and to their sui generis nature under 
conditions of modernity. It points to their fundamental embeddedness in so-
cial life as well as their roots in imaginary confi gurations of meaning. Th e no-
tion of political imaginary draws attention to the fact that political meaning 
is essentially social and not reducible to individual meaning-giving. Studies 
that draw on this notion thus demarcate themselves from both Marxism and 
Liberalism which they critique for failing to appreciate the fact that societies 
are always acts of political creation, an act which becomes self-refl exive in 
democracy.
Th e work of two thinkers has been particularly seminal with regard to the 
theorisation of political imaginaries: that of Claude Lefort and Cornelius Cas-
toriadis, both of whom emphasised the historical mode of social life that un-
derpins modern democracy in its understanding of and relation to what they 
defi ne as the political (Breckman 2013; Doyle 2003, 2011; Th ompson 1982). 
Castoriadis and Lefort make a crucial key distinction between the political, 
as an attribute of all societies and politics. Th e latter is an innovation explic-
itly linked to modernity for Lefort, whereas for Castoriadis the fl ourishing of 
politics in modernity consists of a reactivation of the ancient Greek discovery 
of politics as collective autonomy. (Lefort’s distinction is also central to the 
writings of Marcel Gauchet on the tensions of the contemporary democratic 
imaginary as his essay in this issue illustrates; Gauchet 2015). Both Casto-
riadis and Lefort stress that plurality and historical variance are at the heart 
of the democratic condition. Th ey diff er, however, in how they defi ne the 
political and by extension on how they interpret modern politics (we return 
to this below). For Castoriadis, the political is a dimension of any society’s 
self-institution which takes the form of explicit power, of forms of authority 
that are ‘capable of formulating sanctionable injunctions’ (1991, p. 156). For 
Lefort, drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, the notion incorporates 
that of symbolic representation: power is always power of representation and 
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the political is actually what allows society to institute itself by providing it 
with a ‘form’ that allows it to become aware of itself. Lefort (1988) expresses 
this idea through a rather elliptic play on words when he says that a society’s 
‘mise en sens’ (structuring of meaning, in others words the creation of its imag-
inary identity) is both a ‘mise en forme’ (the creation of a specifi c form given 
to human coexistence, the creation of a ‘regime’) and a ‘mise en scène’ (staging, 
in the sense of theatrical representation). For Lefort, to understand a society, 
is then to understand it in terms of its own defi nition of power, as the specifi c 
symbolical response by human beings, given in diff erent historical contexts, 
to the problem of their coexistence.
Th e political is thus at the heart of a society’s very being. Politics, on the 
other hand, concerns the relationship which a society entertains to the power 
structures it has established (Lefort 1988). Although all human societies dis-
play a political dimension, the political is not institutionalised in the same 
way, while politics manifests itself in diff erent ways and in various arenas de-
pending on historical and societal contexts (cf. Smith 2012). In Lefort’s terms, 
modern politics – or policy – refers to explicit political activity or the struggle 
for public power in society, which takes on a specifi c guise in modern democ-
racies. Politics as a delineated sphere or set of activities has been historically 
instituted as a result of a fundamental shift in the social imaginary of modern 
societies. Castoriadis’s view, on the other hand, is more radical and normative 
in that politics for him only exists when it is self-refl exive, when it includes 
active societal engagement, and concerns the common good.13
Th ese insights are important, in that politics is too often understood as 
a self-evident phenomenon, undergirded by self-explanatory, universalistic 
principles, such as representation, equality etc. (cf. Rosanvallon 2009). Lefort, 
in contrast, argues that the distinct modern understanding of politics is his-
torically institutionalised, but has remained blind to its own historicity. Th is 
blindness was a result of the way ideology replaced religion in the defi nition 
of society’s identity and erected transcendent principles supposedly emanating 
from the natural world itself (Lefort 1986). In contrast with the discourse of 
political ‘science’, which is concerned with the surface mechanics of politics, 
Lefort’s approach establishes that the more general (and prior) political and 
historical constitution of modern democracy – its specifi city as a political re-
gime, the principles on which it is based, and the distinct meaning of the rel-
egation of politics to a confi ned societal sub-sphere – ought to constitute the 
fundamental object of refl ection. It draws attention to the obscured divisions 
in modern societies as well as to the tendency to leave the general principles of 
politics untouched by critical refl ection:
Th e fact that something like politics should have been circumscribed within 
social life at a given time has in itself a political meaning, and a meaning which 
is not particular, but general. Th is even raises the question of the constitution 
of social space, of the form of society, of the essence of what was once termed 
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the ‘city’. Th e political is thus revealed, not in what we call political activity, 
but in the double movement whereby the mode of institution of society ap-
pears and is obscured. It appears in the sense that the process whereby society 
is ordered and unifi ed across the divisions becomes visible. It is obscured in 
the sense that the locus of politics (the locus in which parties compete and in 
which a general agency of power takes shape and is reproduced) becomes de-
fi ned as particular, while the principle that generates the overall confi guration 
is concealed (Lefort 1988, p. 11).
Th is ‘principle’ which Lefort alludes to and which, as seen above, he de-
fi nes as a process of symbolisation ultimately originates in the social imagi-
nary. In this regard, it is useful to return to Castoriadis in that it is in his 
work we fi nd more explicit refl ections on the relation between the political 
and imagination, although his work is not without conceptual tensions in 
this regard (cf. Karagiannis and Wagner 2012). In Castoriadis’s understand-
ing of politics, that is, politics as the possibility of society to act upon itself, 
refl exive political engagement emerges only in two precise historical instances, 
in ancient Greece and in modernity. It is only in these historical contexts of 
autonomous societies (rather than the heteronomous ones that predominate 
in human history) that a more radical imaginary and connected forms of 
social doing are able to emerge in society and to inform the political. Such a 
radical imagination entails an explicit engagement with the uncertainty and 
indeterminate nature of human society, which resists closed views of the hu-
man world’s reliance on an otherworldly dimension.
Th us, under circumstances of democracy, a special relation between politics 
and the imagination can be identifi ed, which involves ‘struggles over the col-
lective outcome of imagination’ (Karagiannis and Wagner 2012, p. 14). In a 
way similar to Lefort’s insistence on the dangers of closure, whose radical reap-
pearance in modern form he identifi ed in totalitarianism (1986, pp. 273-291). 
Castoriadis’s view is critical of (rationalistic) attempts to diminish the (radical) 
political imagination by means of an insistence on the institutionalisation of 
an ideal order or political arrangement framed by universalism. Such attempts 
are nowadays often based on notions of human and fundamental rights, the 
rule of law, and divisions of power. One of his key insights is that imagination 
is ultimately unpredictable and cannot be fully channelled or grasped a priori. 
Lefort equally emphasises this indeterminate nature of democracy, in which 
every aspect of society can ultimately be questioned, although he was less dis-
missive of the signifi cance of modern liberalism in which he saw the creation 
of a new imaginary of power, which cannot be dissociated from democracy. 
Building on his analysis of totalitarianism as an attempt to deny social confl ict 
and political indeterminacy by reintroducing a unitary representation of soci-
ety fused with an egocrat (1986, pp. 292-306), Lefort defi ned the imaginary 
of modern democratic power as an empty space (lieu vide); that is, popular 
 34 Suzi Adams, Paul Blokker, Natalie J. Doyle
sovereignty exercised by people who never incarnate it but merely represent it 
for the limited time set by elections (Lefort 1988).
Th e political imaginary of democracy requires extensive refl ection and ex-
ploration, but does not receive such attention in much of political philoso-
phy and political science. In Castoriadis’s and Lefort’s engagement with the 
democratic imaginary, distinctive dimensions come to the fore that tend to be 
overlooked in rationalistic and institutionalist approaches to democracy. Th e 
latter promote a closure of refl ection by pursuing the quest for an ‘ideal’ good 
order. Th e modern democratic imaginary is, however, ultimately grounded in 
an internal view of justifi cation, or, in other words, the democratic order can 
only be justifi ed by means of reference to society and social relations itself, not 
by reference to extra-societal markers such as religion or nature. Th is means, 
fi rst, that democracy entails a highly uncertain and indeterminate political 
form, which is open to critique and re-imagination, and, second, that it is 
ultimately impossible to fi nd a durable solution to the political question with 
which all human societies are confronted. Th ere is, at its basis, an irreducible 
tension between the instituted reality of society and the world as an overarch-
ing horizon (which can only ever be partially grasped in, by, and as institu-
tions). Castoriadis terms this the interplay between kosmos and chaos. Less 
explored by Castoriadis himself, but of great importance for the analysis of 
political imaginaries is the acknowledgment of agon or political struggle in 
which various political imaginaries are contested, on the one hand, and the 
changing nature of democratic societies over time, on the other. One upshot 
of such a view is that democratic societies are understood as less cohesive than 
much of sociological and political-theoretical work takes them to be, as well 
as being inherently confl ictual and grounded in a variety of social meanings. 
Th is also means that such a view recognises how various political imaginaries 
may underpin distinctive types of democracy (cf. Blokker 2010; Eisenstadt 
1999; Lamont and Th evenot 2000; Taylor 2002).
Th e necessity for an analysis of (shifting) political imaginaries in con-
temporary times is evident. In an age of intensifi ed internationalisation and 
globalisation, as well as the fragmentation of nationally based political com-
munities, the linkage between the democratic imaginary and a commitment 
to (collective) autonomy seems to have become less and less self-evident. Cas-
toriadis already labelled contemporary ‘advanced democracies’ as ‘liberal oli-
garchies’ (Castoriadis 1991, p. 231). Th e imaginary signifi cation of autonomy 
has lost its hold in contemporary democracies leading to a possible ‘lack of 
political imagination’ (Karagiannis and Wagner 2012, p. 26), and appears in-
creasingly displaced by attempts to achieve some form of closure. Th is occurs 
through the promotion of imaginaries of technological or technocratic mas-
tery (technocratic/elite rule), of cultural unity (populism), and/or depoliti-
cised or ‘natural’ universal principles (human rights). 
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Th e imaginary signifi cation of collective autonomy has increasingly lost its 
purchase, and must be related to the aff ront of neo-liberalism as a radical form 
of capitalist modernity. Th is neo-liberal form of capitalism, as it has emerged 
from the 1970s onwards, can be linked to a radically individualised notion of 
autonomy and self-realisation (cf. Boltanski and Chiapello 2005), which in 
itself contributes to the depoliticisation of the public realm, not least in terms 
of social solidarity. Th e explicit posture of some form of interrelationship be-
tween political modernity in its democratic form and economic modernity 
in its capitalist form makes the contemporary predicament more intelligible: 
the decline of democracy is also a consequence of the emergence of the idea 
of radical market society and its radicalisation of individualism. But it equally 
strongly suggests a political basis of capitalism, that is, the idea that the econ-
omy is always in some way politically constituted (as Joerges et al. 2005 have 
it, we should understand the ‘economy as a polity’). Regarding the dominance 
– and resilience – of contemporary neo-liberal capitalism, it is then possible 
to argue that there is both a relative lack of political imagination (in terms of 
the articulation of alternatives) and a closure of the economic imaginary in the 
form of depoliticisation, meaning the active denial of the need for a political, 
public discussion of the means and ends of the market economy (cf. Blokker 
2014; Straume and Humphrey 2010).
II. Th e Ecological Imaginary
Neo-liberal capitalism as an instantiation of closure of the political imag-
ination intensifi es the unending pursuit of rational mastery, as Castoriadis 
characterised the social imaginary signifi cations of capitalism. Th e dominance 
and resilience of contemporary neo-liberal capitalism has widely-recognised 
implications and dangers for the world’s already-imperilled environments and 
there is signifi cant opposition to the degree of destruction of the biosphere. 
For Castoriadis the counter-point of capitalism’s quest for rational mastery is 
the project of autonomy. While he did not use the phrase ‘ecological imagi-
nary’ it is possible to discern in his work an approach to such a demarcation 
of the limits of modernity and a reconceptualisation of the continuities and 
discontinuities of the human and non-human world. What is often taken as 
the other of the social – nature – is gravely at risk and there is an urgent need 
to interrogate the various imaginaries of nature in modernity as well as the 
images of nature that underpin current debates concerning the environment. 
Modernity has seen the realm of history invested with meaning, whilst con-
comitantly the kosmos has been stripped of its intrinsic signifi cance. Modern 
forms of rationality and rationalisation, such as those embedded in the classi-
cal scientifi c worldview, have underscored the ‘meaningless’ of nature, whilst 
the expansion and intensifi cation of the imaginary signifi cations of capitalism 
have rendered the natural an endless ‘quarry’ of resources without cultural 
signifi cance. Th at being said, even notions of nature as seemingly bare of 
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meaning and reducible to rational knowledge alone (such as those at the core 
of scientistic and capitalistic imaginaries) still demonstrate a very particular – 
and peculiar – confi guration of meaning only possible through the emergence 
of the social-historical condition of modernity. Many of the current elabora-
tions of modernity’s core social imaginaries (see the above section on the fi eld 
of social imaginaries) have generally downplayed – or ignored – the imaginary 
of ‘nature’ as a central signifi cation for the modern human condition (un-
like ‘history’ or ‘freedom’). In these cases, nature is reduced to a background 
phenomenon, as it is not considered a purely generative (and we might add, 
human created) signifi cation.
Castoriadis is a partial exception to this neglect. Examination of the shifts 
in his ontology and his philosophy of nature indicate an exploration of the 
ecological imaginary (Adams 2011, 2012). Th ere are two inter-related parts 
to his thinking: his ontology in Th e Imaginary Institution of Society (1987) and 
ecological politics in relation to his project of autonomy. In Th e Imaginary In-
stitution of Society, nature is cast as the ‘fi rst natural stratum’ which is self-orga-
nising (but not self-creating). Th e fi rst natural stratum encompasses physical 
and organic strata of nature. A perceptible shift in his thinking occurred after 
the initial publication (in French) of the Th e Imaginary Institution of Society in 
the late 1970s. Over the course of many years of participation in lively debates 
around biological being (and particularly in exchanges with the Chilean bi-
ologist Francisco Varela), Castoriadis developed a distinctive characterisation 
of the living being. He increasingly reconsidered the creative aspects of nature, 
and during the 1980s began to argue for all modes of being (both human and 
non-human) as self-creating. As part of this shift, he began to develop a poly-
regional ontology of modes of being for-itself which spanned the living being 
to social-historical being. Common to each of these modes of being was the 
capacity to ontologically create a proper world (Eigenwelt) (Castoriadis 1997, 
pp. 142-150). Th e living being is characterised by three capacities: ‘the fi nality 
of self-preservation, self-centredness, and the construction of a world of one’s 
own’ (Castoriadis 1997, p. 143). Each kind of being for-itself exercises the 
three characteristics in ways that go beyond elementary sentience. Living be-
ings are thus able to ‘image’ and ‘relate’ diff erent elements of the environment 
as ‘a world of one’s own’ thus creating a primary horizon of ‘proto meaning’ 
of existence (Castoriadis 1997, p. 148). In acts of representation of related 
elements diff erent beings are creating (and not just assembling) worlds for 
themselves and all beings do this – notwithstanding the signifi cant variations 
of existence marking diff erent modes of being.
With this shift, Castoriadis elucidated ‘a general ontology of creative emer-
gence’ (Adams, 2012, p. 319). It is important to stress that he did not collapse 
the specifi city of human modes of being into nature; that is, he maintained 
the tension between nomos and physis at the political level, whilst extending 
his notion of self-creation as physis more generally at the ontological level to all 
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regions and modes of being. If, as Castoriadis suggests, creative emergence is a 
shared ontological condition of all living beings then the degree of continuity 
between humanity and other species is greater than he had earlier reckoned. 
Yet the notion of nature elaborated in Th e Imaginary Institution of Society 
(1987) endured in Castoriadis’s adherence to the project of autonomy which 
presupposed a specifi c form of creation instituted by human societies; that is, 
the capacity for autonomous self-determination (as nomos). Castoriadis’s con-
clusions in his second philosophy of nature developed across the 1980s and 
1990s therefore have further implications for his overall project. One sym-
pathetic critic believes that ‘he never reformulated the central themes of his 
philosophy in light of ecological thought’ (Clark 2002, p. 74). Th is is a hasty 
judgment. Th e above account of his philosophy of nature shows a second 
phase in which he departed from more sociocentric perspectives to anthropo-
logically situate humanity in the world. In connecting with what Adams calls 
‘a Romanticist imaginary of nature’ (2011, pp. 137-144), Castoriadis places 
humanity in constant worldly engagement with nature. By implication, Cas-
toriadis not only recuperates a Romantic vein of thought and representation 
but also develops a line of inquiry that could lead in diff erent directions other 
than the project of autonomy.
Th is brief survey of Castoriadis’s conception of nature and ecology would 
be incomplete, however, without a presentation of his more specifi c thinking 
on ecological politics and autonomy, which also emerged in the 1980s. In 
his 1981 publication on ecology and autonomy (crafted with Daniel Cohn-
Bendit) Castoriadis argues that ecology calls into question the social by prob-
lematising the creation of needs, questioning the neutrality of the Enlighten-
ment’s scientifi c imagination and illuminating the collective desire for con-
quest of non-human worlds within the capitalist imaginary. Yet, ecology also 
casts doubt over the conceptual apparatus of political economy by invoking 
‘the total position and relation between humanity and the world and, fi nally, 
the central and eternal question what is human life? What are we living for?’ 
(1981, p. 14). By raising and addressing the ‘primary questions’ in a certain 
way, ecology was pre-fi guring future of the project of autonomy in Casto-
riadis’s optimistic estimation. Ecology’s capacity to apprehend environmental 
crises as a problem of the social imaginary gives its questions and arguments a 
radicalism in the sense of going to the fundaments of the capitalist imaginary. 
His angle on the ethics of autonomy – as it might be known in another regis-
ter – is vital in countering the hubris of the imaginary signifi cation of rational 
mastery; that is capitalism’s tendencies to endless growth. Ecological auton-
omy in his assessment is ‘the question of the self-limitation of society’ (1981, 
p. 19; emphasis added) in the most general sense. Specifi c currents of green 
politics do not in themselves necessarily produce the politics of self-limitation. 
But ecology tends to situate human life in the world. ‘It isn’t a love of nature; 
it’s the need for self-limitation (which is true freedom) of human beings with 
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respect to the planet on which they happen to exist by chance’ (Castoriadis 
2010, p. 203). Reconceiving the continuities and discontinuities of humanity 
on the basis of collective self-limitation would be a starting point for the re-
imagination of forms of sustainable worldly engagement with nature.
As mentioned above, Castoriadis’s reconsideration of science and knowl-
edge from the vantage-point of a philosophy of nature is consubstantial with 
the outgrowth of his interest in physis. But at the same time he does not aban-
don his overall emphasis on the imaginary of nomos. Th e latter remains a 
key discontinuity between human and other modes of being. Arguably his 
advances towards a far-reaching theorisation of the ecological imaginary 
founded on this particular and signifi cant limit to his ontology. In addition, 
with his emphasis on a radical notion of time as creation, the problematics 
of space and place do not fi gure in his political thought, in general, and his 
philosophy of nature, in particular. Yet, as key phenomenologists have shown, 
phenomenology of experiences of place would seem to be vital to imaginaries 
of nature (Casey 1993; Malpas 1999; Sallis 2000; c.f. the essay by Nakamura 
Yujiro (2015) and the accompanying introduction by John Krummel (2015) 
in this issue). In this vein, a notion of place/space as qualitative and dynamic 
would be an important complement to Castoriadis’s notion of qualitative 
time as creation of otherness (Nishida’s notion of basho would be an impor-
tant resource in this regard. c.f. Adams 2014; Krummel 2014). Re-thinking 
imaginaries of nature and potential ecologies also requires a reconsideration 
of capitalist modernity. Recognition of the close connection between capital-
ism and environmental devastation is of course obligatory. At the same time, 
complexities of modern capitalism can be further elucidated in terms of (a) 
inter-relationships with modern political fi gurations (as we argue in the sec-
tion on political imaginaries) and (b) the sheer varieties of instantiation of 
the capitalist imaginary (Arnason 2001; Smith 2014a, 2014b; Straume and 
Humphrey 2010).
Notwithstanding this, Castoriadis goes further in relating social and eco-
logical imaginaries than any other thinker in the fi eld of social imaginaries 
(see also recent developments by Soper 2009, and Rundell 2012; c.f. Calhoun 
et al. 2015, in the present issue). On the other hand, Taylor’s preliminary 
engagement with ecology in his early Philosophical Papers (1985) and his essay 
on Heidegger (1995) is not continued in Modern Social Imaginaries (2004). In 
this context cross-fertilisation with other fi elds can be a benefi cial strategy. If 
the ecological imaginary is a newly charted frontier for the fi eld of social imag-
inaries, then it is a fresh one also for civilisational analysis, as Arnason (2003, 
p. 218) has noted. Robust approaches in civilisational analysis would need to 
relate to the ontological aspects of the imaginaries of nature discussed above. 
At the same time, the sketches of the ecological imaginary we fi nd in the 
fi eld of social imaginaries could gain from an understanding of the manner in 
which civilisational constellations circumscribe the continuum of human and 
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non-human worlds and shape the degrees and types of responsiveness to the 
contemporary crisis of environmental atrophy. While these specifi c connec-
tions cannot be detailed here, suggestion of a productive cross-fertilisation of 
this sort demands some elaboration of general articulations of the two fi elds of 
social imaginaries and civilisational analysis, to which we now turn.
III.  Multiple Modernities, Comparative Civilisations and 
Social Imaginaries
Common ground between the fi elds of social imaginaries and the com-
parative analysis of civilisations has yet to be fully delineated and explored. 
Studies of civilisations have proliferated since the 1980s when S. N. Eisen-
stadt (1986) led renewed interest in questions of Axial civilisations emergent 
in Eurasia in the fi rst millennium BCE. Karl Jaspers (1953 [1949]) famously 
theorised this period as the Axial Age. Comparative and historical sociolo-
gists joined histories in multidisciplinary projects that fostered debates about 
the emergence of refl exivity and complex creativity (Arnason, Eisenstadt and 
Wittrock 2005; Bellah and Joas 2012). Discussions of the diffi  cult coales-
cence of civilisational patterns with defi nable ontological distinctions of dif-
ferent levels of reality – the ‘transcendental’ and ‘mundane’ in Eisenstadt’s 
terms – alluded to social imaginary signifi cations without explicitly invoking 
‘social imaginaries.’ Principally, the imagination of a higher order of reality 
had ramifi cations for how economic, political, religious and cultural life were 
structured and reformed, according to advocates of Axial Age hypotheses. Th e 
Axial Age was debated as one in which civilisations capable of problematising 
and re-imagining the worldly order emerged (Taylor 2012). Ancient Greece 
has been an exemplar of Axial transformation from some points of view just 
as it was paradigmatic of creation and autonomy in Castoriadis’s eyes. Begin-
ning with the Homeric imagination, the Greeks were the fi rst to question the 
given world, a conclusion separately reached by Eisenstadt and Castoriadis 
(Arnason 2012). Many of the disputes about Axial Age civilisations are un-
settled, however, including the generation of varieties of refl exivity across dif-
ferent civilisations. Be that as it may, the quality and nature of the questions 
raised about this era of cultural and ontological diff erentiation and second 
order cognitive refl exivity relate to major changes in the modes of life. As it 
broached metatheoretical issues so innovatively, the Axial Age debate acted to 
refi ne civilisational analysis as a paradigm. Moreover, it marked the emerging 
paradigm with a defi ning feature: pluralism. Pluralism and metatheoretical 
reconstruction became defi ning features of civilisational analysis and featured 
in its most contentious claims.
Along with the retrieval of the Axial Age, civilisational analysis has debat-
ed the controversial proposition of multiple modernities, fi rst developed by 
Eisenstadt (2000). Th e intention was clearly to guide civilisational analysis in a 
more deeply pluralistic and non-Eurocentric direction. ‘Multiple modernities’ 
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is a kindred perspective of civilisational analysis that Eisenstadt and his col-
laborators developed along a long path out of modernisation sociology. Th ey 
have not been alone in infusing the concept of modernity with an awareness 
of pluralities. Gaonkar theorised a notion of ‘alternative modernities’ (1999; 
2001), Pieterse one of ‘new modernities’ (2012), Th erborn ‘entangled mo-
dernities’ (2003), Arnason’s ‘multiplication of modernity’ (2002), and Kaya 
‘later modernities’ (2004) to mention only a few. If social theory is dense with 
attempts to reformulate the idea of modernity, Eisenstadt and his associates 
distinguish themselves by delimiting the cultural ontologies of multiple civilisa-
tions to arrive at a portrait of multiple modernities. Th ose cultural ontologies 
thereby set a conceptual limit to the number of modernities under analysis. 
For Eisenstadt cultural ontologies frame processes of cultural, political and 
economic institutionalisation.
Taylor and Arnason merit special consideration in the context of consid-
eration of multiple modernities, civilisations and social imaginaries. Taylor 
sees the imaginary as background meaning enabling moderns ‘to grasp society 
as objectifi ed, as a set of processes, detached from any agential perspectives’ 
(2004, p. 163). Th e connection with multiple modernities is latent in his 
elucidation of social imaginaries. On one hand, he analyses a distinct social 
imaginary which diff erentiates Western modernity. Western modernity imag-
ines a collective order running through categories of sovereignty, democratic 
practices and a democratic public sphere, and market economies. Th e particu-
larity of the West lies in, for instance, imagination of the economy as a system 
rather than a set of practices. Connections between particular social imaginar-
ies and modernities are expressly made, even though Taylor does not invoke 
the phrase ‘multiple modernities’. On the other hand, his feeling is that there 
are other modernities other than the West, which implicitly he leaves to others 
to spell out (Taylor 2004, pp. 195-196).
Arnason goes further in the comparative historical sociology of ‘other’ mo-
dernities through development of a theoretical perspective that reconfi gures 
Castoriadis’s elucidation of the social-historical as part of a civilisational frame-
work (Arnason 2003, 2012). In eff ect he challenges the fi eld of civilisational 
analysis to deepen its pluralism with understanding of the multiplication of 
modernity thereby invoking multiple imaginaries. In his post-transcendental 
phenomenological terms, if the social imaginary (in the singular) can be cast as 
a world, then the imaginary is also relative to diff erent forms of interpretation, 
processes of state formation and regimes of accumulation, that is civilisational 
contexts of meaning, power and wealth. Arnason activates a cultural herme-
neutic of modernity (and multiple modernities) by reconceiving civilisational 
forms as socio-cultural contexts of worldhood. Th us, crucially, modernity is 
not self-grounding but is rather grounded in relation to – and encounters 
with – a variety of ‘others’, including classical antiquity, intercultural oth-
ers, inter-civilisational others, and intra-cultural constellations. Th e cultural 
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hermeneutic of modernity is brought to bear in cases of highly creative civili-
sational constellations through exploration of how meaning and institutions 
of power and wealth are generated through encounters within and between 
civilisations. In instances of particularly intense and creative encounters forms 
of interpretation become highly active in processes of transformation. In his 
own comparative historical sociologies, Arnason examines how creative in-
terpretations of traditions have informed formations of Soviet and Japanese 
modernities. In this regard, Arnason links post-transcendental phenomenol-
ogy to historical sociology in order to deepen a pluralistic conceptualisation of 
civilisations. Arguably, however, the comparative analysis of civilisations has 
yet to fully assimilate the hermeneutical turn he has initiated. 
With perspectives on civilisations, social imaginaries and modernities such 
as Taylor’s and Arnason’s, civilisational analysis has become a more open fi eld. 
Other currents add to the range of viewpoints. Social theorists, historical soci-
ologists, world historians and archaeologists are joined in the growing fi eld of 
civilisational scholarship by comparativists in international relations and eco-
nomic sociology (Hall and Jackson 2007; Katzenstein 2010). Interdisciplin-
ary research carried out in this vein has thus far achieved much in exploring 
and debating the character of institutional and economic dimensions of past 
and present social formations. In particular development of longer histories 
of transformation across Eurasia has produced two telling results. First, it has 
brought attention to early modernities (explored along with multiple moder-
nities) with fi ndings that bring richer nuances to arguments that the trajec-
tories of modernity had sixteenth century beginnings, rather than roots in 
the eighteenth century Enlightenment. Second, it has rightly created the im-
pression of a higher level of connection, encounter and engagement between 
civilisations than previously reckoned. Th e longer historical view at work in 
civilisational analysis, however, also underscores the multidimensionality of 
social formations and the variety of modernities referred to above. Not only 
is more empirical and historical research needed; modifi cation of the entire 
frame of civilisational analysis is an imperative, particularly in light of debates 
around social imaginaries.
Th ere are therefore grounds for further elaboration and clarifi cation, at 
the interstices of philosophy and social theory, of the central problems of 
civilisational analysis. Calls from outside the fi eld for a stronger emphasis 
on experience as well as interpretation (Wagner, 2015) and for engagement 
with Critical Th eory (Delanty 2010) suggest that the interpretive and criti-
cal energies of civilisational analysis could expand still further. Along with 
Jose Domingues’s (2012) invocation of ‘civilisational imaginaries of mo-
dernity’ as the counter-weights of global modernity and new currents in 
international relations scholarship there is also evident potential for new 
versions of civilisational analysis after Eisenstadt and in wake of his focus on 
cultural ontologies. International relations scholars researching civilisations 
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and world politics traverse histories of the present. Th ey draw heavily from 
funds of social and political theory, but are not generative of theory as such. 
Domingues’s sociology by comparison is quite theoretically ‘agile’, though 
enticingly incomplete when it comes to social imaginaries. His image of 
the civilisational imaginaries of modernity is fragmentary but serves as a 
reminder of the critical conditions of the present. Eisenstadt (2004) too 
supplied a prompt on the present in his analytic of the ‘civilisation of mo-
dernity’, as has, from another point of view, Roland Robertson (1987) with 
his sociological refl ections at the interface of civilisational analysis and the 
globalisation paradigm. All three are timely supplements to the sharp his-
torical sensibilities of civilisational analysis which sometimes leave scholars 
in the fi eld focused on past horizons rather than present issues. Much re-
mains ill-defi ned on this frontier, however. Eisenstadt’s civilisation of mo-
dernity is the least systematised aspect of his sociological theory and Rob-
ertson’s globalism has not been extensively debated in civilisational analysis. 
Domingues’s alternative links globality with a budding notion of civilisa-
tional imaginaries. Yet this remains a promissory note about articulation 
of a diff erent direction – civilisational imaginaries and globalities in the 
present – rather than a defi ned position. A great deal of potential exists for 
theoretical exchange between the fi elds of civilisational analysis and social 
imaginaries. 
Conclusion
As noted, the social imaginaries fi eld is heterogeneous. Indeed, as Calhoun 
et al. (2015) observe in this issue, the term ‘social imaginaries’ has been used 
in a way that can empty it of content. What is needed is a more systematic 
approach and comparative research program to build on and extend the key 
contributions to the fi eld without fl attening the ongoing confl ict of interpre-
tations. In other words, the social imaginaries fi eld opens onto problematics 
which resists closure. We argued that social imaginaries has much to off er 
as a paradigm-in-the-making. Th is is especially the case when the theoreti-
cal frameworks underpinning it are not simply reduced to ‘culture’ or ‘cul-
tural meaning’ but incorporate notions of social doing and power, as well. Its 
phenomenological and hermeneutic sources make it particularly helpful in 
developing an open (as opposed to closed) conception of culture as modes of 
being-in-the-world, that allow it to fruitfully engage with questions of the in-
tercultural aspect of the human condition, be that at a concrete political level, 
or at the macro-level of multiple modernities and civilisational analysis. Social 
imaginaries presuppose society as a self-altering social world comprised of in-
stituted and instituting aspects: it is thus well placed to elucidate movements 
towards social change, as well as recognising the existence of meaningful so-
cial practices. Finally, social imaginaries underlie notions of socio-political 
 Social Imaginaries in Debate 43
critique: for to be able to change social worlds, means that social worlds can 
be problematised and put into question. 
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Notes
1 Th e ‘First Attempt’ is taken from the sub-title of his essay published fi rst in 
Socialisme ou Barbarie and then, with very minor addenda, in the1964-65 section 
of Th e Imaginary Institution of Society, as ‘Th e Imaginary and the Institution: A 
First Approach’.
2 Ricoeur’s seminars on the philosophy of the imagination are currently in 
preparation for publication in both French and English (Edited by George Taylor).
3 Th e Castoriadis/Ricoeur dialogue is currently being edited by Olivier Fressard 
and Johann Michel for publication in a collection of essays commissioned by the 
EHESS. Publication is expected in 2015.
4 Castoriadis does not ignore the phenomenon of power but it is treated 
unsystematically in his thought.
5 Th is disagreement is at its most explicit in their Radio France (Culture) discussion
6 See Kearney 1988, p. 155-156.
7 Numbers followed by A in parentheses refer to pagination from the German 
original of the fi rst edition Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and those followed by B 
refer to pagination from the second edition (both in Kant 1965 and 1993). 
8 Wayne Waxman, for example, reads Kantian imagination as a non-discursive form 
of spontaneity in contrast to the understanding that is the discursive form of 
spontaneity. See Waxman 1991, pp. 285-86.
9 Kant calls this creative act of the productive imagination in the schematism, 
‘fi gurative synthesis’ (1965/1993, p. B151).
10 As noticeable in the functioning of the symbol (e.g., beauty as the symbol for 
morality) in the aesthetic realm. See Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1952), §59.
11 For example, Johann P. Arnason, John Rundell, and Cornelius Castoriadis’s essays 
in G Robinson & J Rundell (1994).
12 Th e claim that Heidegger was totally silent on the subject of the imagination after 
his Kant-reading of the 1920s (Castoriadis 1994, p. 136) is plainly not true. See 
Krummel (2007).
13 It must be pointed out that Castoriadis and Lefort off er diff erent assessments of 
the relationship between the economic and political dimensions of modernity 
which translates into a diff erent interpretation of democratic autonomy and 
of the historical signifi cance of the Greek model. Castoriadis established a 
stark dichotomy between the imaginary of limitless (pseudo)rational mastery 
underpinning and the imaginary of democratic autonomy defi ned by an 
acceptance of historical indeterminacy. By contrast, Lefort’s work stressed the role 
played by a new relationship to the natural world (encapsulating the notion of 
work) in the formation of a modern historical perspective predicated on a new 
understanding of state power (see below, in main text) essentially distinct from the 
historicity evident in Greek democracy (Lefort 1978 [1953]; ‘Th e Permanence of 
the theologico-political?’ in Lefort 1988). Th e idea that the economic perspective 
and the notion of market played a role in the historical genesis of modern 
liberal democracy was developed by Lefort’s erstwhile doctoral student Pierre 
Rosanvallon in Le Capitalisme Utopique. Critique de l’idéologie Économique (1999 
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[1979]). It also inspired the theory of modernity put forward by Marcel Gauchet 
(another former student of Lefort) in Th e Disenchantment of the World (1999). In 
recent writings (see ‘Democracy: From One Crisis to Another’ in this issue, 2015) 
Gauchet has presented a critique of the oligarchic evolution of contemporary 
democracy which evokes one of the strong themes of Castoriadis’ work. Whilst 
Gauchet’s analysis also rejects Castoriadis’s opposition between capitalism and 
democracy, like Lefort’s work before it and its understanding of ideology, it still 
remains indebted to Castoriadis’s exploration of the roots of human institutions 
in imaginary constellations of meaning (Doyle 2013).
